The Battle of Borodino, September 7th, 1812

Background

The French Grande Armée had begun the invasion of Russia in June, 1812. Alexander I proclaimed a Patriotic War in defense of the fatherland. The Russian forces — previously massing on the Polish frontier — fell back before the invaders in the face of the speedy French advance (see main article on the invasion). Count Michael Barclay de Tolly was commander-in-chief of the Russian army. His attempts at forming a defensive line were thwarted time and again by the fast moving French line, but Barclay's constant retreat was nevertheless perceived as an unwillingness to fight, and he was removed. The new Russian commander, Prince Mikhail Kutuzov, although much more fierce in his rhetoric, was also unable to establish a defensive position until within 125 kilometers of Moscow. Kutuzov picked an eminently defensible area near the village of Borodino and from September 3 strengthened it with earthworks, notably the Rayevski Redoubt in the center-right of the line and three open arrow-shaped 'Bagration fleches' to the left.

The Engagement

Earlier estimates placed the size of Kutuzov's army at 112,000, but this figure later grew to 125,000. Most recently, however, historians believe the true figure was much higher — in fact somewhere between 154,800 and 157,000. The reason for the disparity between the original figures and the modern ones is the presence of 30,000 Russian militia or opolcheniye as well as around 10,000 irregular Cossacks. Most of these never took part in the combat operations and so are discounted. However if this is to be done, then all 25,000 men of the French Imperial Guard should also be discounted as they never fired a shot all day (Napoleon kept them in reserve as he awaited raids by Russian light cavalry). Either way the Russians had a numerical advantage (there were approximately 125,000 - 130,000 French and allied soldiers). Furthermore their fortified position and their artillery superiority — 640 pieces to 584 — further accentuated this advantage. All in all Kutuzov can be praised for setting himself up very effectively prior to the battle.

Napoleon's conduct during the battle suggests that his tactical decisions were marred by his efforts to avoid a "Pyrrhic victory". He was also suffering from a fever at the time, which may explain his uncharacteristic detachment from the battle as well as his unusually simplistic battle plan.[2]

When Napoleon was faced with the Russian defenses his usual tactical skill appears to have left him, although regular bouts with illness since entering Russia , might be to blame for this lack of genius. He ordered a frontal assault straight at the Russians. It is believed he was seeking a decisive encounter that would destroy the Russian army in one day. The initial French attack was successful if costly; the King of Naples, Joachim Murat, directed a joint cavalry and infantry attack that by early afternoon had broken through the Russian line and seized the Rayevski Redoubt, lost it and retaken it. But the Russians committed their reserves and the battle ground down into a bloody attritional mess. Even with the Russians nearly at breaking point, Napoleon would not commit to sending in the French Imperial Guard, fearing a battle possible the next day. A Russian counter-attack was broken by artillery; and as night fell, both sides disengaged. At night, after discussing with his officers, Kutozov decided not to resume battle the next day and retreat, allowing the French to take Moscow . He had doubts that the Russian army could withstand another day of battle, and thought it was more important to preserve its strength rather than try to save Moscow at all cost. In retrospect, it was a wise decision.

Aftermath

The Russian retreat opened the way for the French to seize Moscow on September 14, 1812, but the capture of the city would prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for the French.

The battle was famously described by Leo Tolstoy in his novel War and Peace as "a continuous slaughter which could be of no avail either to the French or the Russians". A huge panorama representing the battle was painted by Franz Roubaud for the centenary of Borodino and installed on the Poklonnaya Hill to mark the 150th anniversary of the event. http://www.museum.ru/museum/1812/English/Painting/rubo/index.html

Text taken from Wikipedea

The Map

This is the second version of this field, created by [HWK]Stu, and still features all of the important aspects of the real battle…The Grande Redoubt discussed above, the three open arrow-shaped fleches (which can be seen in the screen shot previous page) the village of Utitza on the Russian left (map left) where the French Polish troops attacked, the streams, ravines and even the color of the ground as portrayed in the paintings linked above. This second version has put the armies at a different angle, and has a richer interpretation of the ravines that laced the field. Also be aware that the forest which seperates the Russian left flank at Utitza from the rest of the line is in fact blocked. Troops cannot move through it, so do not get trapped against these woods! The French (blue) are on the attack and must push the Russians (green) out of all their defensive positions. If the Russians lose and cannot regain the Grande Redboubt and the 3 fleches, they must surrender. No upgrades.